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ABSTRACT
In this paper a normative position will be defended. We will argue that minimal territorial
minority language rights formulated in terms of the personality principle referring to traditional
minority languages granted in the framework of the European Union (EU) are a benchmark for
non-territorial linguistic rights. Although territorial minority languages should be granted collective
rights this is in large parts of Europe not the case. Especially in the Central and Eastern European
Member States language rights granted to territorial languages are assigned on the basis of personal
language rights. Our argumentation will be elaborated on the basis of a comparative approach
discussing the status of a traditional territorial language in Romania, more in particular Hungarian
spoken in the Szeklerland area with the one of migrant languages in the Netherlands, more in particular
Turkish. In accordance with the language hierarchy implying that territorial languages have a higher
status than non-territorial languages both in the EUs and Member States’ language regimes non-
territorial linguistic rights will be realized as personal rights in the first place. Hence, the use
of non-territorial minority languages is conditioned much as the use of territorial minority languages
in the national Member States. So, the best possible scenario for mobile minority languages 
is to be recognized as a personal right and receive full support from the states where they are spoken.
It is true that learning the host language would make inclusion of migrant language speakers
into the host society smoother and securing a better position on the labour market. This should
however be done without striving for full assimilation of the speakers of migrant languages for this
would violate the linguistic rights of migrants to speak and cultivate one’s own heritage language,
violate the EUs linguistic diversity policy, and is against the advantages provided by linguistic
capital in the sense of BOURDIEU (1991).
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we will compare the legal status of traditional minority languages and migrant languages
in the European context and its practical implications for the trade-off between mobility and inclusion.1
In fact, below it will be demonstrated that territorial minority languages as traditional minority
languages are usually referred to enjoy restricted linguistic rights in the European Member States,
where they are spoken. It has been argued that traditional minority languages in Central and Eastern
European Member States have less rights compared to official languages and that their status and
position is best described by language hierarchies, asymmetries, subordination, and threshold restrictions.
This against the background of international and EU treaties, such as article 22 of the European Charter
of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) stating that the Union respects cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity.2
Although linguistic inequality in these cases is an unwanted state of affairs violating the ECFR,
and other international treaties and obligations of Member States, it is realistic to suppose that these
traditional minority language cases will function as a benchmark for the assignment of linguistic
rights to languages of migrants to which we will refer in the remainder of this paper as non-territorial,
mobile minority languages. Although among the traditional minority cases of linguistic inequality
there are instances of successful practices because peaceful co-existence is guaranteed. This,
however is realized at the expense of the traditional minority languages in a language regime
that assigns these languages restricted rights only. The language rights of non-territorial minorities
in the EU are not only restricted by a language policy favouring full support for the official majority
language at the expense of traditional territorial minority languages, but they are further restricted
by the mobility-and-inclusion trade-off, which is detriment to the mobile minority languages.
1 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
(FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 613344. See for the equilibrium between mobility and inclusion GRIN
et al. 2014.
2 See VIZI 2012 for an extensive discussion of ECFR in connection with linguistic rights.
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Governments tend to intervene in the language regime on behalf of the official host language
of the state at the expense of mobile languages. Therefore, it is safe to hypothesise that the quality
of the linguistic rights of non-territorial minorities in the EU or in individual Member States
due to a lack of a Union wide supranational language policy for mobile language minorities
will be under the assigned level of the linguistic rights which territorial minority languages 
in the EU or individual Member States enjoy. 
Our discussion will take the linguistic rights within the new Member States of Central and
Eastern Europe as a starting point, for these states are clearly defined as national states with one
official language spoken by the majority population. All other languages spoken in these states are
considered minority languages. These traditional minority languages are not integrated into the country’s
language policy on the basis of the territoriality principle but on the basis of the personality principle,
even if the minority language speakers are in the majority in a specific sub-national jurisdiction,
such as in the case of the Hungarian speaking Szeklerland in Romania which we will discuss.
The application of the personality principle granting a lower ranking official status to the traditional
minority language results into bi- multilingual asymmetries, subordinations, and so forth, in reference
to the official, majority language. 
It is difficult to characterise the EU as a political entity. It can be argued that it is a hybrid
structure compromising institutional aspects of the traditional European system of nation states
and institutional aspects of federalism, such as the European Commission and other institutions
of the EU.3 In order to understand the politics of multilingualism in the Member States of Central
and Eastern Europe, it is necessary to investigate political and institutional aspects of both systems,
i.e. the nation state system and the more recent supranational features of the EU. Seemingly, there
is a conflict in this system. Most of the traditional nineteenth century nation states are characterised
by the concept of “one state-one nation-one language,” whereas the supranational aspects 
of the EU imply a different relation between the different levels of governance. In the European
framework, there is no one-to-one mapping between citizenship-institutions and language.
Here comes in the politics of multilingualism, for the language regimes and the use of individual
languages is depending on power constellations.4 Although a complete multilingual regime 
is guaranteed in the EU by language regulation 1/1958 this language regime has not “percolated
down” to the Member States. By and large, a restricted set of languages in the Member States
are official and might function as a lingua franca for the citizens that live in the territories where
those languages are used. This traditional language situation, characterised by a so-called upgrading
of national languages onto the level of the EU, does not hold factually in the Member States of the EU.
European language policy is further guided by an educational resolution that was adopted 
at the Barcelona European Council in 2002, the so-called ‘1 + 2 formula’.5 The Barcelona formula
states that all citizens should be taught to master at least two foreign languages in addition 
to their mother tongue. A recent resolution on multilingualism adopted by the European Parliament
on 24 March 2009 states that that the Union “[r]eiterates its political priority of the acquisition
of language skills through the learning of other EU languages, one which should be the language
of a neighbouring country and other international (...) ‘lingua franca’ (...)” (compare article 36). 
3 See MCCORMICK 2015; LELIEVELDT – PRINCEN 2014. 
4 See MARÁCZ 2012.
5 See MARÁCZ 2012. 21. 
2018. 4. Studies 43
The conflict consists in the fact that in the traditional model of nation states the matching between
the official language of the nation state and the mother tongue of its citizens is taken for granted.
The language policy schemes of the EU leave more space for the detachment of mother tongue
and official languages, as compared to the traditional nation state scheme. This detachment has been
recognised by the Council of Europe, an organisation monitoring the issue of human and minority
rights in the Member States of Europe and which is closely involved in the conditioned accession
of candidate Member States to the EU.6 Two conventions of the Council of Europe guarantee
the linguistic rights of traditional minorities in the states that are a partner to these legal treaties,
i.e. the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) signed 
on 1 February 1995 in Strasbourg, and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages
(ECRML) adopted on 5 November 1992 also in Strasbourg.7 Both charters have been included
by the Union as one of the four accession criteria – the so-called Copenhagen criteria – for EU
membership. Especially the new EU-candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe having
traditional ethno-linguistic minorities on their territory had to fulfil the obligations of these charters
before they could enter the Union. As a result of these supranational interventions concerning
member state accession, a supranational linguistic space in the EU has been developing.8 The conflict
can be resolved in a flexible framework of multi-level governance (MLG) which is able to absorb
the characteristics of the national Westphalian system and the federal aspects of the EU system.9
The idea is that policy is generated as an outcome of the interplay between different levels of governance,
distinguishing different tiers that might operate autonomously but also in an interactive fashion,
including the supranational Brussels, the national, regional, and local tiers. 
Below the working of the European system in the case of linguistic diversity will be discussed
and compared. Hence, if linguistic rights of mobile minorities in the EU or in the Member States
will be granted, it is to be expected that this will take place in reference to the existing linguistic
rights for traditional minorities. A relevant case is presented by the Hungarian speaking minority
in Romania’s Transylvania. Although the conditions for an application of the territoriality principle
are fulfilled, the linguistic rights situation of traditional minority languages in Romania is regulated
in accordance with the personality principle.10 This gives us a point of reference of what the limits
of the linguistic rights for migrant languages in the European space are. In most European
Member States, non-territorial minority languages or the languages introduced by migrants 
or internally mobile European citizens have hardly or no legal position at all. Realistically speaking
migrant languages will not enjoy in the near future a higher level of linguistic rights than traditional
6 See the following references: GÁL 2000; SKOVGAARD 2007; SCHWELLNUSS 2005.
7 See SKOVGAARD 2007; MARÁCZ 2016. 31–32.
8 Compare BRUBAKER 1996; CSERGÕ – GOLDGEIER 2013; MARÁCZ 2014a, 2015a, 2015b, 2016.
9 See the papers in SCHOLTEN – PENNINX 2016. 
10 The territoriality versus personality principle was first discussed in McRae (1975). The ’territoriality versus personality
debate’ is one of the most important debates concerning language policy and language rights, roughly speaking
whether rights should be attached to the person, i.e. the so-called ’personality principle’, or whether they should
be connected to territory, i.e. the so-called ’territoriality principle’. The debate plays a central role in language policy
and language planning; it is a key issue in understanding ethno-linguistic struggles and the demarcation of the rights
of linguistic minorities. See also LAPONCE (1987) and DEMBINSKA et al. (2014) for further discussion. See for an extensive
discussion of these principles in connection with the Hungarian language minority in Romania CSATA – MARÁCZ (2016).
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minority languages that have a legal position in the Member States. In order to make a realistic
estimation of the linguistic rights to be granted to mobile minority languages in the EU or individual
Member States these rights will not surpass the linguistic rights of traditional minority languages
in national states, such as Romania. Hence, the linguistic rights assigned in those cases will 
be in terms of the personality principle. 
In the course of this paper, we will elaborate on two case studies representative for the linguistic
rights situation of a traditional minority language and a mobile minority language, i.e. Romania’s
minority languages, especially Hungarian and migrant languages in the Netherlands, i.e. Turkish
respectively. Comparing the two cases will also give insight into what policy measures can
contribute to the optimal equilibrium between mobility and inclusion.
TRADITIONAL MINORITY LANGUAGES IN ROMANIA
There are several territorial minority languages spoken in Romania, including Hungarian, German,
Roma, and others. In principle, these minority languages have a similar legal position and have
been granted the same type of linguistic rights. Although the conditions for a territorial language
regime granting traditional minority languages equal linguistic rights to the majority language
are fulfilled, i.e. in sub-national territorial jurisdictions the minority language is in majority only
the personality principle is operative in these cases and territoriality is used as a negative restriction
due to a threshold of twenty percent of minority language speakers in a certain territorial jurisdiction.
Hence, even if there is a majority of minority language speakers in a certain jurisdiction,
linguistic rights are only granted at an individual, personal basis and not as a collective right.
Let us consider the case of traditional, territorial minority languages in Romania in more detail.
The Hungarian minority in Romania counted by the latest 2011 census 1,227,623 persons
who make up 6.5 percent of the total population of Romania.11 However, the Hungarian
speaking minority is predominately concentrated in the north-western part of the country, 
i.e. the Transylvanian region, stretching from the Hungarian–Romanian country border to Szeklerland
at the feet of the Eastern Carpathians mountains.12 This “stroke” is a traditional multi-ethnic
region and the ethnic Hungarians are not present in it in equal concentrations. The percentages
of the ethnic distribution of ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania clearly differ
from the national percentages. 
In the whole area of Transylvania, ethnic Hungarians make up around 19 percent of the total
population, while ethnic Romanians make up around 75 percent. The remaining six percent are
other ethno-linguistic groups, like Germans, and Roma. Transylvanian Hungarians inhabit three
spatially connected sub-regions displaying a different and heterogeneous geo-ethnic distribution. 
The first sub-region ‘Partium’ is located in the Hungarian–Romanian border area in northwest
Romania. In this region, a substantial percentage of ethnic Hungarians constitute a majority 
11 See CSATA – MARÁCZ 2016 for extensive discussion of the demographic situation in Romania’s territories with
Hungarian minority language speakers. 
12 The Szeklers (Hun. Székely) are an ethnic Hungarian group in Transylvania displaying a peculiar set of ethnographic,
cultural and linguistic features. In the Hungarian kingdom, they were employed as border guards defending the isolated
Eastern Carpathian mountain range (see CSATA – MARÁCZ 2016).
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in a number of municipalities and districts, except the greater towns like Oradea (Hun. Nagyvárad)
and Satu Mare (Hun. Szatmárnémeti). The second sub-region, the area landward is central
Transylvania with the major city of Cluj-Napoca (Hun. Kolozsvár). In this region, the ethnic
Hungarians are often smaller minorities and live frequently in mixed Hungarian–Romanian–Roma
communities, but in some municipalities and districts they can have a relative or absolute majority.13
The third sub-region, which is matching the historical area of Szeklerland is of approximately
13,000 km2 and consists of the three counties Harghita (Hun. Hargita), Covasna (Hun. Kovászna),
and Mures (Hun. Maros).14 More than a half of the Transylvanian Hungarians live in Szeklerland
and display an absolute majority. Note that what the Hungarian community in Romania calls
FIGURE 1 Ethnic map of Transylvania (2016) (Source: CSATA – MARÁCZ 2016.)
13 See BRUBAKER et al. 2006.
14 According to CSATA – MARÁCZ 2016, following recent methods of record determined by the accessibility of statistical data,
the population of Szeklerland refers to the residents of Harghita (Hun. Hargita), Covasna (Hun. Kovászna) and Mures
(Hun. Maros) counties. The territory of “historical” Szeklerland – the one that existed during the Hungarian Kingdom –
differs from this, it included the following smaller regions (seats): Bardoc-Miklósvár-, Sepsi-, Kézdi- és Orbaiszék
(in today’s Covasna/Kovászna county), Csík-, Udvarhely- és Gyergyószék (in today’s Harghita/Hargita county)
and Marosszék (in today’s Mures/Maros county). A smaller region in Aranyosszék (in today’s Cluj/Kolozs county)
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‘Szeklerland’ is not recognised by the Romanian state; the term itself does not appear in any
official national or international document ratified by the Romanian state. The total population
of Szeklerland, that is the population of the three counties Harghita, Covasna, and Mures together,
is according to the 2011 census numbering 1,071,890 persons. The ethnic Hungarian share of the total
population of Szeklerland is 609,033 persons (56.8 percent), which is an absolute majority.15
More specifically in Harghita, Covasna and Mures the absolute figures and percentages of the ethnic
Hungarian population are as follows: 257,707 persons (85.2 percent); 150,468 persons (73.7 percent);
and 200,858 persons (38.1 percent). Note that in two of the three Szekler counties, namely Harghita
and Covasna the ethnic Hungarians have a clear majority.
After the collapse of communism, the Romanian language regime anchored in the 1991 Constitution
is clearly path dependent on the historical state tradition displaying two “diagnostics”.16 The first
diagnostic is the language hierarchy. This hierarchy is caused by the official status of the Romanian
language in the Romanian Constitution providing the Romanian language a hegemonic position
outranking all other minority languages spoken on the territory of Romania, including Hungarian. 
The second diagnostic is asymmetric bilingualism. Successive Romanian Constitutions guarantee
the language use of the other languages of Romania, including the minority languages, only 
on the basis of the personality and not on the basis of the territoriality principle.17 Territoriality
is relevant for the use of the Hungarian language and other minority languages, but only as a negative
condition restricting the personality principle by a demographic factor, i.e. the twenty per cent
threshold rule per territorial-administrative unit.18 This implies that Romanian mother tongue
speakers do not need to learn or to speak Hungarian, even if they live in administrative-
territorial units with a Hungarian majority, like the counties of historic Szeklerland. However,
all Hungarian minority speakers have to learn and to speak Romanian. The latter but not the
former is a requirement in the official primary and secondary school curriculum. As a consequence,
the Hungarian language use is restricted in scope and although legally not banned from Romanian
educational institutions where the language of instruction is Romanian, Hungarian is not offered
to their pupils. This leads then to asymmetric bi- and multilingualism. Bi- an multilingual ethnic
Hungarians always speak the official language of the country, i.e. Romanian and their own mother
tongue Hungarian, whereas ethnic Romanians only speak the official language of the country.19
However, research makes clear that asymmetric bilingualism is disadvantageous for the weaker
language, in this case the Hungarian minority language as opposed to the Romanian state language.20
15 According to CSATA – MARÁCZ 2016, out of the total population of Szeklerland, the ethnic affiliation of 38,096 persons
is unknown. These persons were added to the results obtained in the original census survey using a very controversial
methodology. So, if we distribute this population according to the ethnic ratios of the original census data, the number
of Hungarians would increase with 20,665 persons to 629,698 and their proportion to 58.7 percent. Using the same
method of estimation, the number of Hungarians in Transylvania would increase by 56,487 persons to 127,3153 and
their proportion would change to 18.8 percent.
16 See MARÁCZ 2017 for a detailed discussion of Romanian path dependency.
17 See DEMBINSKA et al. 2014.
18 See MARÁCZ 2014b.
19 Next to international languages as English, German or French.
20 See LAPONCE 1987; CSATA 2016. 
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Although Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007 is a clear critical juncture in the country’s
state tradition affecting many features of the political, socio-economic and institutional spheres both
“diagnostics” of the traditional language regime can clearly be observed in the societal context.21
The critical juncture of 2007 has not brought a fundamental change in the language policy 
of the country. There is no equality of the languages used on the territory of Romania, or in its
Transylvanian parts where most of the minority languages are being spoken, nor is there symmetric
bilingualism in Transylvanian administrative-territorial units with a Hungarian majority, such as
in the traditional counties in historic Szeklerland.22 From the point of language policy the accession
of Romania to the EU can hardly be called a critical juncture. 
It is true that the liberal regime in Central and Eastern European space of which Romania
is a part too has some positive side effects on the language use of the minority languages that
are due to the liberal democratic and commercial market society empowering the use of minority
languages in the public spheres. European transnational actors and structures have positively affected
the language situation of minority languages after the accession of Romania to the EU as well.23
After the collapse of communism and the expansion of the EU eastwards, global and transnational
structures have led to the introduction of European human rights norms and standards in the field
of minority rights and minority language rights in Central and Eastern European countries. Even
more robust policies in support of indigenous minority rights and languages have been adopted
by the Council of Europe. All the Member States of the EU are members of the Council of Europe
and its arrangements in these domains have been part of the set of conditions to enter the EU.24
Conditionality as a part of the EUs accession criteria has guaranteed the implementation of the Council
of Europe’s minority rights arrangements.25 Of the conditionality requirements two legal treaties
of the Council of Europe are relevant in this case, namely the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities (FCPNM) and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
(ECRML) signed on February 1, 1995 and November 5, 1992 in Strasbourg respectively.26
The Framework Convention supports the positive discrimination of national minorities on the basis
of human rights and general freedom rights, although the explanatory report text is ambiguous
on the status of minority groups.27 It emphasises the individual belonging of persons to national
minorities and does not recognise the collective status of national minorities.28 The ECRML,
“Language Charta” has been motivated by similar considerations. Languages are seen as part
21 See for a discussion of the notion of critical juncture the introduction of SONNTAG – CARDINAL 2015. 
22 Compare MARÁCZ 2017. 
23 Compare MARÁCZ 2014c, 2015c.
24 See GÁL 2000, SCHIMMELFENNIG – SEDELMEIER 2005, GRABBE 2006, SASSE 2005, 2008, MARÁCZ 2015b.
25 The Council of Europe has its own sanctioning mechanism through the legally binding judgements within the framework
of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and its Court. Minority rights are included in the ECHR,
such as the prohibition of discrimination on the base of language in article 14. Romania is part of this treaty since 1994.
Recently the ECHR has been interpreted also as a collective obligation to protect minority rights. Compare VIZI
2012 for detailed discussion.
26 See SKOVGAARD 2007; MARÁCZ 2016. 31–32.
27 See Council of Europe. 1995. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report.
H(95)10. Strasbourg.
28 This is explicitly stated in the paragraphs 13, 31, and 37 of the explanatory report of the FCPNM.
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of a common cultural heritage and the protection of languages is deemed necessary to counterbalance
assimilatory state policy and uniformisation by modern civilisation.29 Note that Romania, just like
all the other Central and Eastern European states with Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities,
has also ratified these international instruments, as is shown in Tables 1 and 2:
Table 1: Framework Convention (FCPNM, CETS no. 157)
Table 2: Language Charter (ECRML, CETS no. 148)
Therefore, national and ethno-linguistic minorities receive recognition and protection from
these supranational arrangements, 
So, the position of the Hungarian minority language is governed by the personality principle,
especially in the domains of education and public administration, it enjoys “external,” supranational
protection from the CoE’s treaties and from the transnational spaces which have been created
in Europe.30 Due to the transnational spaces information and communication flows via Internet,
social media and so on the use of the Hungarian language both in the private and public sphere
is heavily intensified. Before we compare the linguistic situation of traditional, territorial linguistic
minorities with the one of mobile linguistic minorities let us first discuss in the following section
the linguistic rights of mobile minority languages in the EU. The section will focus on migrant
languages in the Netherlands, especially Turkish. 
MIGRANT LANGUAGES IN THE NETHERLANDS
In this section, the practical angle referring to mobile minority languages will be discussed.
Would it actually be beneficial for mobile minorities and the host society, if non-territorial linguistic
minorities are granted more rights and facilities in order to construct an optimal equilibrium
between mobility and inclusion, or would such a step be counter-productive? This question will
be answered by drawing upon historical and contemporary examples from the Netherlands, 
a country that has received a significant number of immigrants since the 1960s, and has experimented
with different cultural and linguistic integration policy frameworks. Furthermore, the experiences
29 See BRUBAKER et al. (2006); MARÁCZ (2011). 
30 See JANSSENS et al. (2013).
State Signature Ratification Entry into Force
Romania 01/02/1995 11/05/1995 01/02/1998
State Signature Ratification Entry into Force
Romania 17/07/1995 24/10/2007 01/05/2008
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from Turkish migrants with Dutch language policy will be discussed. This information is based
on a dataset compiled of in-depth interviews collected between 2015 and 2017.31
Since the 1960s, the Netherlands has been, similarly to other Western-European countries,
a main destination, for both European and non-European migrants. Due to the rapid growth 
of the post-war economy and the increasing disinterest of the Dutch population in accepting
work at the lower end of the job market, the Dutch government actively recruited temporary
foreign workers between the 1950s and in the mid-1970s. In the early periods, most workers
originated from southern-European countries such as Italy and Spain, but in the 1960s and
1970s the majority came from states such as Morocco and Turkey. Among government officials
the question rose what the appropriate policy response to this newfound ethno-linguistic diversity
in the Netherlands should be. One of the first documents that sought to formulate the beginnings
of an answer is the “Nota Buitenlandse werknemers” (Note on Foreign workers), drafted jointly
in 1970 by four Dutch ministries, including Social Affairs & Health Ministry, Ministry of Justice,
Ministry of Economic Affairs, and Minstry for Culture, Recreation and Societal Affairs. The document
emphasises the economic nature of the foreign migration flow and discusses potential problems
regarding recruitment.32 Dutch policy at the time emphasised the temporary nature of these
migration flows, assuming that most foreign workers would return to their countries of origin
once their labour contracts had ended. When it came to the adaptation of migrants to Dutch
culture and society, the notion of “mutual adaptability” was of key importance. Both migrants
and the native Dutch population needed to get accustomed to the new situation. The concept remained
vague however, and was rarely backed up by actual policy measures. In practice, the guest worker
system revolved around circular migration, with migrants coming to and leaving the country
according to the time periods of their labour contracts. This situation changed in the late 1970s.
The Dutch authorities acknowledged that many migrants planned to stay in the Netherlands
indefinitely, and even made use of their right to family reunification to bring their wives and
children to the Netherlands. This new reality called for concrete policy measures. One of the first
comprehensive policy briefings is the so-called “Nota Minderhedenbeleid” (Minorities policy
document), which continued the philosophy of “mutual adaptation,” but also attempted to make
it concrete with a set of policy interventions. One of the main interventions announced in the Minorities
policy document was the so-called “Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur” (Education in mother
tongue and culture) policy, also abbreviated as OETC. The main argument to implement this policy
was practical: it was assumed by the Dutch authorities, on the basis of socio-linguistic research,
that migrant children would be better capable of learning Dutch if they mastered their mother
tongue first. This view is still shared by many linguistic and psychological studies. Learning
one language that the child is already somewhat familiar with at a proper level makes the transition
towards learning a second language, in this case Dutch, much easier. Thus, the Dutch authorities
organised classes in the main migrant languages, such as Turkish and Arabic at primary schools,
that were specifically designed for the migrant children. The Dutch government primarily perceived
itself as a facilitator rather than the main organiser of mother tongue education. Initiatives 
of immigrant communities to self-organise mother tongue education were financially supported
by the authorities, as long as these initiatives did not hinder Dutch language acquisition. 
31 This research is a part of Houtkamp’s PhD research.
32 See Nota Buitenlandse werknemers. 4.
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This system of shared responsibilities, but with a focus on the role of the migrant communities,
produced rather mixed results. In the early 1990s, the main scientific advisory bureau of the government,
the “Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid” (WRR) (The Netherlands Scientific
Council for Government Policy) critically analysed Dutch integration policies and also discussed
OETC extensively. The WRR criticised the unproven effectiveness of the mother tongue education
programme and the immigrants’ children poor mastery of the Dutch language. Mother tongue
education was according to the WRR poorly organised, mainly because of a lack of good study
material and, most importantly, a severe lack of qualified teachers. Teachers were often recruited
from the migrants’ country of origin and usually lacked a connection with the Dutch society and
sometimes also did not have a teaching degree. This combination of a poor evaluation of the mother
tongue education system, and an increased focus on Dutch language acquisition, inspired governments
to gradually deconstruct the mother tongue education facilities, by first reducing its teaching
hours and eventually by abolishing it all together in 2004. 
This very brief overview of the Dutch situation makes it clear that simply granting educational
rights to non-territorial languages is not sufficient to guarantee a vivid linguistic landscape in practice.
The Dutch history regarding mother tongue education presents several important considerations
for future policy-makers who might wish to experiment with new facilities for immigrant languages.
Firstly, a government should not merely be a facilitator, but an active organiser of mother tongue
education, to ensure the consistency and quality of the courses offered. Secondly, it is of paramount
importance whether a government treats non-territorial language rights as accessory to integration,
or as an intrinsic value. The Dutch government pursued a policy of what could be called “pragmatic
multiculturalism”: mobile minority cultures were nurtured and facilitated, but mainly for a pragmatic
reason (i.e. serving as a bridge to Dutch language acquisition). It is therefore unsurprising that
after the WRR concluded there was no empirical proof that mother tongue education benefitted
Dutch language acquisition in any way, that OETC (later renamed to OALT, ‘Onderwijs in Allochtone
Levende Talen’ [Education in allochtonous living languages] was slowly deconstructed and
eventually abolished. There was another reason why the Dutch government abolished the mother
tongue education for immigrant children. In-depth studies on the language proficiency of migrants’
children, who had participated in home language education in elementary school, radically changed
the policy perspective. It turned out that especially Turkish and Moroccan youngsters in their last
year of elementary education at the age of twelve faced serious deficient language skills in Dutch
compared to their Dutch classmates. Due to the delay in language development, migrant children
had to qualify for lower types of secondary education, resulting into a much worse position 
on the labour market. In 2004 the Dutch government concluded that mother tongue education
was a detriment to solving this problem, since immigrant children also faced deficient language
skills in Dutch. The Netherlands decided to abolish the state-sponsored heritage language education
of migrant children in elementary school. From then on, all educational efforts were concentrated
on teaching migrants and their children only Dutch at school. The switch from a multicultural
to an assimilatory language policy was thus motivated first and foremost on economic grounds.
It was argued that improving Dutch language proficiency among migrants and their children
was needed for strengthening their position on the labour market. But also among the migrant
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communities the opinions with reference to the education of immigrant children in their heritage
language, even if it was offered in a restricted way, was also different, as interviews with members
of the Dutch Turkish community underline. 
Migrant communities are naturally one of the most important actors in the non-territorial
language right debate. The question whether they actually desire the rights that are (or are not)
granted upon them, and how they evaluate the policy measures that are targeted at them is a valid
consideration when designing a policy framework. In practice, immigrants and their descendants
seem to have a rather mixed view on both the principle of migrant rights and its practical application
in the Netherlands. The interviews are part of ongoing field work and analyses attitudes of Turkish
(and Polish) migrants in France, Sweden, and the Netherlands. This section will discuss preliminary
results of the study conducted in the Netherlands. The interviews were held between 2015 and 2017.
Eleven Dutch Turks participated in the research. They lived in Amsterdam or Veendam (near Groningen).
The sample is well partitioned in terms of education level, social class, migration generation
(first, second and third), age (but all older than 18), and gender. Participants have been selected using
a snowball method. It is however complicated, if not impossible, to generalise the results of these
interview sessions to the whole of the Turkish community in the Netherlands. The sample size
is not sufficient for such a purpose. The value of this research is however (at least) twofold.
Firstly, it is one of the few studies about language policy towards immigrants that places the immigrants’
perspective at the forefront. Secondly, the in-depth interview method allows for new perspectives
to emerge that might have been unknown beforehand to the researcher, hence providing perspectives
for new hypotheses and future policy-oriented studies. 
The interviews covered two very significant components of language policy towards migrants:
citizenship courses and/or training in the host language (here Dutch in the Netherlands) and mother
tongue education. Lastly, the interviews covered the connection between the respondents’(perceived)
language skills and their opportunities to be mobile within the EU, hereby also explicitly
including the role of their mother tongue. 
At this place, we will discuss the results pertaining to the topics pointed out above, and if needed
in connection with the respondents’ migration history. The Dutch Turks that were interviewed
were mostly planning to stay in the Netherlands for the mid-long term (at least 5–10 years).
This fact alone incentivised all the interviewees to at least gain a basic understanding of the Dutch
language, and also make sure their children master the language, either by speaking it actively
at home or learning it at school. Especially for the respondents in the lower social classes, Dutch
is considered by far the most important language for them to speak, as they see it as a prerequisite
for economic and social mobility in the Netherlands. Respondents thus supported the idea 
of the government facilitating Dutch language acquisition courses. However, Dutch Turks reported
a lack of proper organisation of the language acquisition classes, both in the past (from the 1970–80s
onward) and in the present. An often cited issue is the lack of an emphasis on oral communication
and a too strong focus on teaching the basics of Dutch grammar. Respondents often felt that
simply being active in Dutch society by working and socialising with native Dutch speakers
would have a significantly more positive effect on their oral communication skills than spending
the evenings in a classroom. Views on Dutch language training were quite coherent both within
and across the migrant groups. It can easily be summarised as follows: it works very well in principle,
but partly fails in practice. 
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Perspectives on mother tongue education were, in contrast with Dutch language acquisition,
very different within the group of Dutch Turks being interviewed. Firstly, there was a remarkable
class difference. As mentioned previously, especially immigrants with a low socio-economic status (SES)
strongly emphasise the importance of learning Dutch. A significant minority of the low SES Turks
are at the same time sceptical about mother tongue education for their (prospective) children.
They mainly cited two arguments. Firstly, they were afraid that bilingual education might hamper
their children’s ability to properly learn Dutch. A second related reason is that they believe
they are capable of teaching their children their mother tongue at home, meaning that there is
no need for bilingual education at school.
Athird reason, that is cited by across all SES-levels, is that they might be afraid that mother tongue
education might lead to segregation. Especially within the Turkish community, which is one 
of the most well organised immigrant communities in the Netherlands, this is seen as a probable
outcome by some Turkish interviewees. One of the interviewed Dutch Turks mentions for example:
“us Turks can easily get by sticking with our own, and just speaking our own language (...),
promoting Turkish at school might make it easier for some people to stay within our own group,
rather than connecting with the Dutch.” It needs to be mentioned that this danger was seen more
in urban areas, with a relative group of Dutch Turks present, as opposed to a town like Veendam,
where the Turkish community is much smaller in size.
At the same time however, there are many interviewees who would applaud a return of the Dutch
OETC system where the government facilitates at least 1 hour (but preferably more) of mother tongue
education in the official school system. They don’t see any of the three problems mentioned above,
even when explicitly asked. Often, they claim that “the more languages you know, the better it is”
(when speaking about bilingual education) and find that there is no danger for the communities
to segregate due to mother tongue education, as long as the children also properly learn Dutch. 
Furthermore, there seems to be an ethnic and generational difference on how the value of mother
tongue education is perceived in the Turkish communities. Turkish interviewees of the first and
second generation often appealed to their heritage and the strong cultural value of their language.
They want them and their children to properly speak Turkish so that they can easily access the fruits
of Turkish culture. When asked by the interviewer “why do you think mother tongue education
is important?” reactions would vary between “because I am a Turk and so are my children,”
“because it is important to at least partially preserve our cultural heritage,” and “I want my children
to be able to return to Turkey one day.” This is different among members of the third generation,
who have a much more instrumental perspective on their mother tongue. They cite reasons
such as “it is useful to know many languages, so why not Turkish?” or “I want to be able to talk
to my family, and I would want the same for my children.” 
As stated previously, the fieldwork is still in progress and more data is being gathered at the moment
of writing this paper. It should also be mentioned again that due to the qualitative nature of the research,
we should be careful with generalising the results to the whole of the Dutch Turkish communities.
The data collected thus far, however, shows some remarkable patterns that could have interesting
implications for the discussion on linguistic rights for immigrants, general language policy discussion,
and future policy research. 
Firstly, host society language acquisition is deemed extremely important by immigrants, 
but they heavily criticise its practical implementation, due to the strong focus on Dutch grammar.
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They think the courses would be much more effective if the focus would lie more on oral
communication skills. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse whether this claim holds
true from an educational point of view, but it is at least a perspective to keep in mind when potentially
reforming host society language acquisition policies. 
Secondly, perspectives on mother tongue education, and multilingualism in general, seems
to be a class-issue. Low SES parents are sometimes discouraged from raising their children bilingually
or give them a bilingual school education due to the fact they perceive it might hamper their
chances of learning Dutch, and thus decrease their socio-economic opportunities in the Netherlands.
This perspective is not supported at all by socio-linguistic research. If a large chunk of low SES
immigrants persist in this misguided view, the linguistic gap between poorer and richer immigrants
may grow, even if immigrant languages are granted extensive rights. The government could
counteract this development with good information campaigns and by for example instructing
teachers to stimulate bilingual education with parents. Field work conducted in Sweden and France
suggests teachers at primary and secondary school play a crucial advisory role for parents.
Thirdly, some immigrants think and see that mother tongue education policies, and multicultural
policies in general, can foster segregation. Again, this could be an undesirable side effect 
of facilitating mother tongue education for migrants.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OUTLOOK
The main question that was put forward in this paper is whether the languages of non-territorial
minorities could benefit from the same facilities currently granted to traditional, territorial minority
languages in the EU. There are different angles from which to approach this topic. In order to answer
the central question of this paper, namely ‘are traditional minority languages a bench marking for
the rights of migrant languages in the European Union?’ we have to make a comparative analysis
of the two case studies presented here, i.e. the status and position of the Hungarian minority language
in Romania and the ones of the Turkish language in the Netherlands. The analysis unambiguously
demonstrates that the traditional minority language is higher on the language hierarchy in its own
national context than a mobile non-territorial language in its Member State context.
The strongest option for minority language protection, i.e. the territorial option is not even
available in the case of traditional minority languages in Central and Eastern European Member States,
like Romania.33 However, traditional minority languages like Hungarian in Romania are assigned
linguistic rights on the basis of the personality principle., that is in terms of individual “personal” rights,
and not in terms of collective or territorial rights, even though in some cases the conditions 
to introduce such a language regime would be fulfilled leading to more respect for linguistic
diversity, the balancing of rights and a more equal position of the traditional minority languages,
such as Hungarian in Szeklerland. For now, the benchmark in which the linguistic rights of mobile
languages in EU Member States can be drafted is under the denominator of “individual rights.” 
In both cases, the dominant position of official state languages is not challenged. Traditional
territorial minority languages enjoy however recognition. The use of these languages is regulated
33 See LAPONCE 1987 for the relevance of territoriality in the case of minority language protection.
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on the level of the Constitution or otherwise in the legal system. The history of Turkish in the Netherlands
demonstrates that the recognition of migrant languages in the context of Member States is fuzzy.
Although Turkish was recognized as a language in the Dutch educational system without real
legal anchoring of migrant languages it was slowly less facilitated in the educational system.
However, mobile minority languages just as territorial minority languages within a national
context could be included into the language regime on a personal basis. This would however
not guarantee equality of the languages involved resulting in asymmetric bilingualism which
is at the disadvantage of the minority language. Majority language speakers, i.e. Romanian 
in Romania and Dutch in the Netherlands do not speak the minority languages but vice versa
is normally the case. Setting asymmetric bi- and multilingualism aside recognition of migrant
languages on the personality basis would satisfy the concept of “linguistic diversity” celebrated
in the European Union, although in a somewhat limited form. 
Recognition of the traditional minority language in the Member States’ legal system also triggers
recognition at the supranational level in terms of European minority and minority language treaties,
as discussed above. Migrant languages completely lack recognition at the European level. 
It is reasonable to suppose that these languages could be integrated under the umbrella of the Language
Charta of the Council of Europe. What makes a pan-European regulation and implementation
complicated is what the interviews with the Dutch Turks unambiguously demonstrate, although due
to the limited scope of the research presented here it might be too early to draw definite conclusions.
In any case, the speakers of migrants languages themselves, like Dutch Turks do not have a uncontested
position on the protection of their own linguistic heritage. Note, that this is very different from
the case of the traditional minorities which have their own interest organizations that lobby for
more linguistic rights.34 Hence, there are clear constraining circumstances that do not support
the practical implementation of migrant languages in the educational system of a host country.
There is an unjustified but persistent belief among policy makers and a part of scientific researchers
that mother tongue education of the heritage language does not benefit language acquisition 
of the host language and spoils changes of migrant language speakers on the EU labour market.
Interviews show that even some parents of migrant children from low SES are in principle not
in favour of extending language rights for their own heritage language because they think that mother
tongue education will lead to unsuccessful integration and negative host language acquisition results. 
Hence, a way out of this situation more in line with respect for the principle of linguistic diversity
in Europe that has been the official stance of many different organs of the EU in a number 
of its official documents (see a collection below) and BOURDIEU (1991) idea of linguistic capital.
BOURDIEU (1991) argues that the more languages you speak the more your financial-economic
value will be at the “language market” as an individual citizens of a country. By providing 
the facilities for reciprocity it would imply access to hidden, untapped resources of linguistic
capital in the sense of Bourdieu.35 The official and educational authorities will have to counterbalance
misguided views that plurilingualism narrows the chances for integration and a better position
34 See CSATA – MARÁCZ 2016 for a discussion of self-determination claims among the Szeklers.
35 Reciprocity can also be justified on the basis of welfare economics argumentation (see CAMINAL 2016) and it is central
in some models of intercultural relations (see GRIN 2007).
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on the labour market. An integration policy without full linguistic assimilation should also 
be granted to children from migrant and intra mobile European citizen families by introducing
language learning facilities for mobile minority languages in educational curricula and open
these courses also for children speaking the host language. In fact, to teach these languages 
in e.g. the elementary school context as it was done in the Netherlands until 2004 and is still done
in Sweden. This implies that there is no segregation in the educational context but reciprocity
would guarantee that the teaching of these mobile minority languages is available in elementary
school education where these languages or other languages of wider communication could 
be offered for both children of newcomer families and children speaking the host language. 
The question is whether social cohesion which is normally safeguarded in national states
by speaking and using the official language of the state will be undermined by introducing reciprocity
in language education. PUTNAM (2007) argues that a high degree of ethnic and cultural diversity
is associated with a decrease in social trust. In other words: in diverse neighbourhoods all citizens,
be they part of a majority or minority group, tend to become more individualistic. Social capital
for the population as a whole thus decreases, which logically leads to lower levels of social cohesion.
To counteract this trend, Putnam pleads in favour of reinvigorating institutions that can positively
influence social capital, such as community centres and sport associations. He also argues strongly
in favour of solid, state sponsored courses in the host language, so all citizens have at least one
common language they can use to communicate. Putnam’s solutions are steering in the right direction.
We also deem good quality host language courses of the utmost importance. Nonetheless
we would like to propose an addition to his solution. It is our claim that if reciprocity is introduced
in the language educational system and autochthonous children learn to speak mobile minority
languages as well social cohesion does not need to be undermined in a context of symmetry.
The recognition of the symbolic value of mobile minority languages could contribute to a quick
inclusion and integration of the children from these groups into society. 
The introduction of mobile minority languages in the educational curricula should further
be conditioned by linguistic subsidiarity which is also conditioning the language use of territorial
minority languages. Granting linguistic rights to mobile minority languages should only apply
in cases, when the mobile minority languages are spoken in sufficient numbers and in a territorial
concentration, such as urban spaces. In sum, in order to guarantee the linguistic rights of territorial
and non-territorial minority languages state recognition, sponsoring and intervention are highly relevant;
reciprocity is considered as a contribution to social inclusion and does not have to be viewed
as a threat for social cohesion; and linguistic subsidiarity and multi-level governance are interpreted
as relevant for securing linguistic diversity. Hence, state intervention, reciprocity, and linguistic
subsidiarity provide background facilities that make possible a language policy that strives for
the optimal equilibrium between mobility and social inclusion.
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